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International Agreement for Control of Cyber Weapons

Tag: INFORMATION WARFARE

January 20, 2017

Russian Cyber War Doctrine

What is the Cyber War Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation? Examining The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, we can see a number of references to the information aspects of war. Below we examine the Russian Military Doctrine of 2010 and compare it to the updated version published in 2015.

Analysis of Russian Cyber War Doctrine

Much of Russian cyber military doctrine is similar to what we would find in the United States. For example, there is an emphasis on the role of information technology in command and control. There also is a specific emphasis placed on development of advanced weaponry using cyber. In addition, the Russian military is charged with protecting the information infrastructure of the Russian Federation.

But it appears that Russian military doctrine defines the cyber and information aspects of warfare in a considerably broader way than in the United States. Here are a few examples:

Information Actions Precede Combat Action.  Before being used, Kinetic force (traditional military action) is to be preceded by all other non-violent instruments of statecraft. Information operations (cyber operations), therefore, are viewed as a precursor to kinetic warfare.

russia-cyber-doctrine-001

Figure 1 –– Differents function of cyber in Russian military doctrine. The references refer to parts of the official Russian Military Doctrine published in 2015(*). These are translated below.

Protection of Russian Territory Includes Information Territory. Apart from protecting the physical territory of Russia, the concept of territory has been extended to include “cyber space” or “national cyber space”, and the military is specifically tasked with protecting all of the cyber space within the Russian Federation.

Cyber Weapons Are Viewed as Increased Threat. In the Russian view, the conventional (including nuclear) strength of the Russian military is such that it is less likely Russian will receive a conventional attack. Paradoxically, the Russians view this as increasing the risk that Russia will be attacked through communication and information technologies. It is a cyber version of guerilla warfare.

Very Broad Definition of Cyber Attack. The type of cyber incident considered by be an “attack” is very broad. It needs only to have an effect on political independence or sovereignty. Any attack against infrastructure also is included. This would cover denial-of-service, or malware. But if a cyber incident has a destabilizing effect on the “social” or “political” situation, then it also is considered to be an attack.

Spiritual and Patriotic Traditions Protected Against Cyber Attack. An information incident can be classed as a “subversive information activity” if it is “aimed at undermining” the opinions of young citizens towards “historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions”. This would mean, for example, that it is the duty of the Russian military to protect Russia against information that undermines Russian traditions.

The Non-Military Population Can be Used for Cyber Defense. The Russian military is empowered to work with non-military elements in Russia for the purpose of taking “information” measures for defense. This refers to the “army” of civilian hackers that work ostensibly outside of government control.

Cyber Attacks Are Authorized Anywhere. The Russian military is authorized to launch a cyber attack (defensive action) against the enemy anywhere in the “global information space”, e.g., not only within the territory of the enemy state.

Cyber Weapons “Indirect and Asymmetric” in Nature. Cyber weapons, and other means, are viewed as being potentially indirect and asymmetric in their utility. In this case, “asymmetric” means “low cost; high impact” or “low cost; high defensive cost”.

Information Operations. The Russian military is empowered to engage in information operations that are aimed at influencing public associations and political groups. The military is empowered to “neutralize” threats through political and non-military means. This is a very broad mandate.

Cyber Espionage is Doctrine. The use of information technology and “modern technical means” is authorized for assessment and forecasting. This is the classical function of foreign intelligence operations.

Control Over Internet to Protect Third Countries. The military is empowered to take steps to make it impossible for any force to use information and communications technologies to influence sovereignty and political independence not only of Russia, but of other states as well.

Excerpts from Russian Cyber Military Doctrine

(The operative terms are underlined.)

Part I §5. The Military Doctrine reflects the commitment of the Russian Federation to taking military measures for the protection of its national interests and the interests of its allies only after political, diplomatic, legal, economic, informational and other non-violent instruments have been exhausted. (В Военной доктрине отражена приверженность Российской Федерации к использованию для защиты национальных интересов страны и интересов ее союзников военных мер только после исчерпания возможностей применения политических, дипломатических, правовых, экономических, информационных и других инструментов ненасильственного характера.)

Part II §11. There is a tendency towards shifting the military risks and military threats to the information space and the internal sphere of the Russian Federation. At the same time, despite the fact that unleashing of a large-scale war against the Russian Federation becomes less probable, in a number of areas the military risks encountered by the Russian Federation are increasing. (Наметилась тенденция смещения военных опасностей и военных угроз в информационное пространство и внутреннюю сферу Российской Федерации. При этом, несмотря на снижение вероятности развязывания против Российской Федерации крупномасштабной войны, на ряде направлений военные опасности для Российской Федерации усиливаются.)

The main external military risks are:
Part II §12(k)(l) use of information and communication technologies for the military-political purposes to take actions which run counter to international law, being aimed against sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity of states and posing threat to the international peace, security, global and regional stability; (использование информационных и коммуникационных технологий в военно-политических целях для осуществления действий, противоречащих международному праву, направленных против суверенитета, политической независимости, территориальной целостности государств и представляющих угрозу международному миру, безопасности, глобальной и региональной стабильности;)

13. The main internal military risks are:
Part II §13(a) activities aimed at changing by force the constitutional system of the Russian Federation; destabilizing domestic political and social situation in the country; disrupting the functioning of state administration bodies, important state and military facilities, and information infrastructure of the Russian Federation; (деятельность, направленная на насильственное изменение конституционного строя Российской Федерации, дестабилизацию внутриполитической и социальной ситуации в стране, дезорганизацию функционирования органов государственной власти, важных государственных, военных объектов и информационной инфраструктуры Российской Федерации;)

Part II §13(c) subversive information activities against the population, especially young citizens of the State, aimed at undermining historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions related to the defense of the Motherland; (деятельность по информационному воздействию на население, в первую очередь на молодых граждан страны, имеющая целью подрыв исторических, духовных и патриотических традиций в области защиты Отечества;)

Characteristic features and specifics of current military conflicts are:
Part II §15(a) integrated employment of military force and political, economic, informational or other non-military measures implemented with a wide use of the protest potential of the population and of special operations forces; (комплексное применение военной силы, политических, экономических, информационных и иных мер невоенного характера, реализуемых с широким использованием протестного потенциала населения и сил специальных операций)

Part II §15(b) massive use of weapons and military equipment systems, high-precision and hypersonic weapons, means of electronic warfare, weapons based on new physical principles that are comparable to nuclear weapons in terms of effectiveness, information and control systems, as well as drones and autonomous marine vehicles, guided robotic weapons and military equipment; (массированное применение систем вооружения и военной техники, высокоточного, гиперзвукового оружия, средств радиоэлектронной борьбы, оружия на новых физических принципах, сопоставимого по эффективности с ядерным оружием, информационно-управляющих систем, а также беспилотных летательных и автономных морских аппаратов, управляемых роботизированных образцов вооружения и военной техники)

Part II §15(c) exerting simultaneous pressure on the enemy throughout the enemy’s territory in the global information space, airspace and outer space, on land and sea; (воздействие на противника на всю глубину его территории одновременно в глобальном информационном пространстве, в воздушно-космическом пространстве, на суше и море)

Part II §15(f) enhanced centralization and computerization of command and control of troops and weapons as a result of transition from a strictly vertical system of command and control to global networked computerized systems of command and control of troops (forces) and weapons; (усиление централизации и автоматизации управления войсками и оружием в результате перехода от строго вертикальной системы управления к глобальным сетевым автоматизированным системам управления войсками (силами) и оружием)

Part II §15(i) use of indirect and asymmetric methods of operations; (применение непрямых и асимметричных способов действий)

Part II §15(j) employment of political forces and public associations financed and guided from abroad. (использование финансируемых и управляемых извне политических сил, общественных движений)

Part III §21(a) to assess and forecast the development of the military and political situation at global and regional levels, as well as the state of interstate relations in the military-political field with the use of modern technical means and information technologies; (оценка и прогнозирование развития военно-политической обстановки на глобальном и региональном уровне, а также состояния межгосударственных отношений в военно-политической сфере с использованием современных технических средств и информационных технологий)

Part III §21(b) to neutralize potential military risks and military threats through political, diplomatic and other non-military means; (нейтрализация возможных военных опасностей и военных угроз политическими, дипломатическими и иными невоенными средствами)

Part III §21(s) to create conditions to reduce the risk of using information and communications technologies for the military-political purposes to undertake actions running counter to international law, directed against sovereignty, political independence or territorial integrity of states or threatening international peace and security, and global and regional stability. (создание условий, обеспечивающих снижение риска использования информационных и коммуникационных технологий в военно-политических целях для осуществления действий, противоречащих международному праву, направленных против суверенитета, политической независимости, территориальной целостности государств и представляющих угрозу международному миру, безопасности, глобальной и региональной стабильности)

Part III §35(b) to provide for a more effective and secure functioning of public administration and military governance system and to ensure communication between federal government agencies, bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and other government authorities in addressing defense and security tasks; (повышение эффективности и безопасности функционирования системы государственного и военного управления, обеспечение информационного взаимодействия между федеральными органами исполнительной власти, органами исполнительной власти субъектов Российской Федерации, иными государственными органами при решении задач в области обороны и безопасности)

Part III §35(j) to improve the system of information security of the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies; (совершенствование системы информационной безопасности Вооруженных Сил, других войск и органов)

Part III §39(d) ensuring the reliable functioning of the command and control system of the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies in peacetime, under the conditions of an imminent threat of aggression and in wartime; (обеспечения надежного функционирования системы управления Вооруженными Силами, другими войсками и органами в мирное время, в период непосредственной угрозы агрессии и в военное время)

Part III §39(h) formation of territorial troops to provide protection and defense of military, state and special facilities, critical infrastructure, including transport, communications and energy, as well as potentially hazardous sites; (формирования территориальных войск для охраны и обороны военных, государственных и специальных объектов, объектов, обеспечивающих жизнедеятельность населения, функционирование транспорта, коммуникаций и связи, объектов энергетики, а также объектов, представляющих повышенную опасность для жизни и здоровья людей;)

Part III §39(l) ensuring effective information security of the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies; (эффективного обеспечения информационной безопасности Вооруженных Сил, других войск и органов)

Part III §46(c) to enhance capacity and means of information warfare; (развитие сил и средств информационного противоборства) Note: The word “противоборства” does not mean strictly “warfare”, but instead means “confrontation” which could be thought of as a level of violence short of full-scale warfare.

Part III §46(d) to improve the quality of the means of information exchange on the basis of up-to-date technologies and international standards, as well as a single information field of the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies as part of the Russian Federation’s information space; (качественное совершенствование средств информационного обмена на основе использования современных технологий и международных стандартов, а также единого информационного пространства Вооруженных Сил, других войск и органов как части информационного пространства Российской Федерации;)

Part III §46(f) to develop new types of high-precision weapons and means of counteracting them, aerospace defense assets, communication systems, reconnaissance and command systems, radio jamming systems, complexes of unmanned aerial vehicles, robotic strike complexes, modern transport aviation and individual protection systems for military personnel; (создание новых образцов высокоточного оружия и средств борьбы с ним, средств воздушно-космической обороны, систем связи, разведки и управления, радиоэлектронной борьбы, комплексов беспилотных летательных аппаратов, роботизированных ударных комплексов, современной транспортной авиации, систем индивидуальной защиты военнослужащих;)

Part III §46(g) to create basic information management systems and integrate them with the systems of command and control of weapons and the computerized systems of command and control bodies at the strategic, operational-strategic, operational, operational-tactical and tactical levels. (создание базовых информационно-управляющих систем и их интеграция с системами управления оружием и комплексами средств автоматизации органов управления стратегического, оперативно-стратегического, оперативного, оперативно-тактического и тактического масштаба)

Part III §55(f) to develop a dialogue with interested states on national approaches to confronting military risks and military threats brought about by the extensive use of information and communications technologies for military and political purposes; (развитие диалога с заинтересованными государствами о национальных подходах к противодействию военным опасностям и военным угрозам, возникающим в связи с масштабным использованием информационных и коммуникационных технологий в военно-политических целях)

Russian Cyber Military Terminology

информация инструмент –– “information instruments”.  This is a general term that applies to any use of information to further nation state objectives, including military objectives. 

информационное пространство –– “information space”. The Russian defines the nation as having an information space. This is the entire cyber infrastructure of Russia, including government, commercial, military and private networks and information processing systems. In this sense, Russians believe it is important to protect this “information space” as much as it is important to protect physical land mass.

информационная инфраструктура –– “information infrastructure”. This refers also to the entire country, but is more specific than “information space” because it focuses on the specific technical details of the computing and telecommunications network.

деятельность по информационному –– “information activities”. This refers to communication of information, such as through publications, the media, social media or other means that can have a negative effect on Russia. These are considered to be subversive.

комплексное применение –– “integrated employment”. Here this refers to the integration of military force with information (cyber) activities by the population.

информационно-управляющих систем –– “information and control system”.  This refers to the cyber components of military weapons. It encompasses everything from general command and control to artificial intelligence or other technologies that enable more intelligence weapons.

глобальное информационное пространство –– “global information space”. This refers to the World Wide Web, and everything connected to it. The doctrine calls for identification of activities on the enemy throughout the world’s cyber infrastructure and then attacking these points, even if they are outside of the national territory of the enemy country.

информационное противоборство –– “information confrontation”. A cyber conflict that fall short of full-scale military warfare.

информационные технологии –– “information technology”. Used the same as in the United States.

невоенные средства –– “non-military means”. Cyber weapons and information operations are viewed as being a type of military action without using kinetic force.

информационная безопасность –– “information security”. Generally the same as the term “cyber security”. It refers to protection of information systems and other infrastructure from hackers.

информационная война –– “information warfare”. Cyber and information operations conducted by the Armed Forces.

обмен информацией –– “information exchange”. Refers to communication within the military.

Russian Military Doctrine Published in 2010

By comparing the 2010 version with the 2015 version above, it is possible to see the giant advance in cyber strategy made by the Russian Federation.

Part I §4. Use of informational instruments for the protection of the national interest.

Part II §9(c). The informational infrastructure of the Russian Federation is a vulnerability because it might be disrupted.

Part II §12(d). Information warfare is an essential component of military conflict.

Part II §13(d). Information warfare should be used prior to kinetic military force so as to shaping international public opinion.

Part III §19(a). Information technology should be used to assess international relations [between countries] and for prediction of political events. (This is a reference to classical intelligence; thus the use of cyber tools to collect intelligence.)

Part III §30(j). Cyber is to be used to provide information support to the armed forces. (This is the same as US doctrine.)

*Part III §41 (c). The armed forces are to develop resources for information warfare.

Part III §41(d). The Russian Federation has an “information space” and the Armed Forces are to have a “single information field” within that space. Cyber is to be improved within those spaces so that information exchange is easier and more efficient. (The concept of a “single information field” for a country is an interesting one. It goes against the idea of the Internet being a global and essentially transnational technical system for movement of information.)

Part III §41(f). Cyber should be used to support “new models of high-precision weapons”.

Part III §41(g). The armed forces will develop information systems that will be integrated for command and control, including automating some functions. This will be done at the “strategic, operational-strategic, operational, operational-tactical, and tactical levels”. (This refers to communication and information exchange within the armed forces.)

Analysis of 2010 Russian Military Doctrine

Much of the Russian doctrine is focused on the use of information technology for improving command and control of the Armed Forces. This includes Part III §30(j), Part III §41(d), Part III §41(f) and Part III §41(g).

Other parts of the doctrine define cyber war as a tool or one method (among many) of protecting the national interest. These include Part I §4, Part II §12(d), and Part III §41 (c).

There is an interesting notion of a national “information space” and the fear that it might be a target for attack by enemies. Part II §9(c), and Part III §41(d).

The final part of the doctrine covers the offensive use of cyber weapons (or information tools) as an extension of state power. First, they should be used to shape international public opinion. Part II §13(d). This is the classic use of propaganda or “public diplomacy” in international relations. Second, they should be used to collect intelligence. Part III §19(a).

The doctrine does not clearly spell out the offensive use of cyber weapons. In Part III §41(f) there is mention of “new models of high-precision weapons”. In generally understood language, this would mean items such as precision guided munitions. It would be possible, however, to define a “new model” weapon as being a cyber weapon. But it is doubtful this is the meaning. In Part III §41(c) there is a call for resources for information warfare, but this is not defined. So possibly cyber weapons could be included under this section.

In any case, the essence of the Russian doctrine is clear. Cyber weapons, or information operations, are to be used in place of kinetic military force preceding a conflict, and hopefully to avoid a further escalation of a conflict. If the conflict deepens, then cyber weapons will continue to be used to support the Armed Forces.

Notes

(*) It was published December 25, 2014.

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January 19, 2017

Cyber War is an Extension of Cultural War

 

The Cyber War we are seeing today is an extension of a deeper cultural war. The only difference is that it is being conducted with different tools, and yet it should have a considerably larger effect today because the means of communication have been so magnified.

The Cold War and the Culture War

Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht(*) has produced an interesting essay that shows the connection between international geo-politics and culture. She argues that the Cold War (in Europe) can be seen in part as a conflict between the cultures of the United States and Europe. The common understanding was that “Americans have no culture”, in comparison to the “High Culture” of Europe. At best, America was a weak shadow of high culture. This followed the views of Joseph Goebbels propaganda which said that “Americans are money-hungry barbarians with no cultural life of their own.” (Quoted by Gienow-Hecht, p. 407) Here, we suppose, one is referencing the masters of classical music, such as Mozart, and the development of sophisticated cultural icons such as ballet, opera, orchestra music, Greco-Roman architecture, the theatre, and classical style painting. Americans, on the other hand, were viewed as having none of that. They were seen as being unsophisticated and “without culture”. As the Cold War developed, the East (Soviet Union) invested in culture as a way to sway minds towards their way of thinking.

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Figure 1 – Technology and national information strategy has changed the balance of power between Russia (Soviet Union) and the United States. In the immediate post-war period, the USSR developed a leading-edge strategy. This was followed by similar actions by the United States. The rise of international data communications through undersea cables and satellites, followed by the Internet set the stage for a revolution in the USA that was not followed in the USSR. The rise of social media has added another layer of complexity. The USA does not have coherent national information strategy for either offense or defense.

In this sense, “information warfare” is simply another aspect of a wider cultural warfare. The idea is that if people admire one culture over the other, then eventually they will vote that way also. Much investment was made in the arts by both sides. According to Gienow-Hecht, from 1945 until the collapse of the Soviet Union, “[b]oth superpowers deliberately employed psychological warfare and cultural infiltration to weaken the opponent and its client states on the other side of the Iron Curtain.” (p. 400, para. 2) Russia exported artistic tours by the Bolshoi Theater, and the USA set up various Amerika Hauser in Germany. Here are a few other aspects of this struggle.

Sowjetische Militar Administration in Deutschland (SMAD). This was operated by the Soviet military. It worked on the assumption that all culture was ideological. SMAD propagated the narrative that the Soviets were Abendlandkultur (saviors of occidental cuture) (p. 402). Sponsored discussions and seminars on German culture, and included artists, writers, sculptors, painters and others to participate. Also worked to denounce non-traditional culture that was leaking in from the United States. This included abstract expressionism and surrealism, which were tied with capitalism and fascism. These ideas were magnified by ideas that the Soviet Union stood for peace, but the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stood for imperialism, militarism and war.

Deutsche Theater. Located in the Soviet sector of occupied Germany. Offered numerous productions of classical European art. Invitations sent out on regular basis to bring over western cultural icons for cultural exchange, which in this context means to convince them of the superiority of the Eastern model of society.

All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) (Всесоюзное общество культурной связи с заграницей). Soviet organization to promote Russia’s “classical tradition”. Jazz was condemned. Shostakovich was praised.

Deutschlandsender (radio). Operated in the German Democratic Republic from 1948-1971. Continued to promote “classical” art, in comparison with “corrosive” western art.

Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft (UFA) later Deutsche Film AG (DEFA). Built theaters and created content for propaganda purposes.

UNESCO. The Soviet Union joined in 1950 and started a program for a “new world information order“, which implied more government control over the press.(**) This interesting debate also developed the concept of “information imperialism”.

GDR Peace Council. East German operation to invite over western intellectuals so as to influence their way of thinking about the East-West conflict.

Ministry of Cinematography (Soviet Union) (Государственный комитет по кинематографии СССР). Creation of films to glorify life under communism. See for example the masterpiece Seventeen Moments of Spring (Семнадцать мгновений весны), which glorifies the work of a Soviet spy working in Nazi Germany.

The American Response

Campaign of Truth. The United States seemed slow to respond. Things started to take shape in the 1950s (half of a decade later). The Americans created a “Campaign of Truth” during the Korean War. This was to advertise the difference between the United States and Soviet Union. It was used particularly during the Korean War, which Kim Il-Sung was operating as a lackey for the Soviet Union. The budget for the State Department increased from $20 to $115 million for information activities.

anniversary__anti_morale_front

Figure 2 – Propaganda cartoon issued by Campaign of Truth during Korean conflict. It shows Kim Il-Sung sitting on a pile of skulls. Date of original June 25, 1951. Issued by the United States Army, 8th Division Korea, Psychological Warfare Section. A full collection is available at the Albert Brauer Psychological Warfare Propaganda Leaflets Collection at the Institute for Regional Studies, North Dakota State University Libraries.

United States Information Agency (USIA). Set up to arrange information programs and cultural exchanges to teach Europeans about American society. Encouraged the “export” of US culture.

Fulbright Program. Facilitates the exchange of researchers, and to “internationalize” scientific research. (See also here under the auspices of the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.)

Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Voice of America. All radio stations. Set up to broadcast pro-western messages.

There was further funding of American cultural exports. These were set up through the Ford Foundation or Rockefeller Foundation. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sponsored the translation of many American classic novels.

Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). A covert CIA program to operate in the cultural realm including conferences, music concerts, and operation of various publications including the magazine “Encounter”.

The Effects on European Culture

It appears that although there remained, and remains today, an image of the United States as not representing so-called “high culture”, the protest and rebellious side of American culture got through. These undercurrents perhaps were at least in part responsible for protests against government power in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe. It set the stage for the Helsinki Accords (Helsinki Final Act)  to have a strong effect in stimulating cultural protest that eventually were at least partially responsible for bringing down the Soviet Union. (See the Accords Part VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.)

Analysis

The Information and Cultural Cyber War of Today

In Figure 1, we have divided the post-war period into four periods.  The figure illustrates that in the immediate post-war period (1945-1950), the Soviet Union and United States were engaged in a battle for the “hearts and minds” of Europe. There was a sense that part of national strategy was to convince citizens in Europe of the superiority of either the communist or capitalist system. Each side had fears. If Germany was “lost” to the West, then Russia might eventually face the re-emergence of a strong competing power. If Germany (and other parts of Europe, e.g., Italy, Greece) were lost to the East, then it would be a security threat to the United States.

During this Cold War, the two sides competed using the traditional media (print, radio, and film, then later television). The East argued that American culture was crude and that the “East” was preserving the High Culture of Europe. The signing of the Helsinki Accords started a process of rebellion, but the seeds of rebellion had been sewn by the disruptive nature of American culture.

The Soviet Union never caught up with the information revolution made possible by the development of international satellite data communications, the integrated circuit and computers. (See the Essay by Gus W. Weiss “The Farewell Dossier“.)  So what has happened is that global data communications and later the Internet enabled the rise of giant multinational enterprises that can operate in an integrated manner across international borders, almost with no concern for the nation state. In addition, the social media applications hosted on the Internet have created the potential for the sudden emergence of powerful social forces, as we have seen in the Arab Spring. These also can operate in a trans-national mode.

In the early stages, social media grew rapidly. Then in response, countries started to take actions to protect their citizens from this giant phenomena. In China, a “Great Internet Firewall” has been set up and government censorship and control of communications is a legal and expected part of life. Similar actions have been taken in Russia, but in a more subtle manner.

At the same time, the Internet has made governments, individuals and organizations of all types vulnerable to hacking.  A giant struggle is going on between countries in this arena. [This blog argues there is a need for a cyber arms limitation treaty.]

But at the heart of the matter is the underlying culture of the Internet and today’s social media. This has spilled out from America to cover the entire earth, and now it is up to adversaries of the USA to develop defensive strategies to “protect” against this threat to their culture. In most cases, it represents a potential threat to their political culture.

But as of this time, no clear strategy has emerged for the United States, which still sees Cyber war as merely a part of computer security, and not as part of a broader competition for the hearts and minds of citizens all around the world.

 

References

(*) See Jessica C. E. Geinow-Hecht, Culture and the Cold War in Europe, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I., Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, Editors, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 419. This blog entry draws heavily upon the professor’s work. In particular the list of programs established by each side. The professor, in her chapter, does not cover any aspect of the Internet or events after the fall of the Soviet Union.

(**) See Carrier Buchanan, Revisiting the UNESCO debate on a New World Information and Communication Order: Has the NWICO been achieved by other means?, Telematics and Informatics, Vol. 32, Issue 2, May 2015, pp. 391-399.

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January 13, 2017

The United States is Losing the Cyber War Race (I)

Part I

Much of the original thinking about Cyber War was developed in the United States. But America has fallen behind. Russian cyberwar doctrine is more comprehensive, more integrated, has more powerful weapons, and is more up to date.

Cyber Warfare must be seen as part of a larger strategy of “Information Warfare”, known in Russia as “Информационная война“. Information warfare is a very broad subject, and includes a number of actions outside of the cyber domain. (Derkachenko writes that “information warfare” as a term is being changed to the term “information operations”,   but the term “cyberwar” is becoming more popular. The United States does not have a regular television show on information warfare, but Russia does. Dimitri Taran runs a very comprehensive show on Channel 1 TV Crimea.

Much Russian writing about Cyber Warfare and Information Warfare draws upon a number of different examples and case studies of conflicts that had, in the Russian view, an important information content. Information warfare is seen to be a type of Twilight Zone somewhere between a Cold War and a “Hot” War. “Thus, by its nature information warfare it occupies a position between the “cold” war . . .  and actual combat with the participation of the armed forces.” See Svargaman, Что такое информационная война? who describes the so-called “next-generation” information warfare as including:  Substitution — Information warfare can take the place of traditional military action, or as Svargaman writes “contactless destruction” [“бесконтактного поражения”]. Use of TV as Weapon — Television channels can be used to manipulate public opinion either by highlighting or obscuring crucial events. The Russian view is that information warfare has limited power, but should be thought of as complementing and enhancing “traditional methods of warfare”. [“информационная война имеет свои границы возможностей . . . дополняет  и усиливает традиционные средства ведения войны”]

In the Russian view, the state (the government) has a strong role to play in management of information on a national basis. According to Pocheptsov, this includes tactical mass mind control, agenda-setting (information management), and strategic  management of mass consciousness. [“Тактическое управление массовым сознанием; Управление информационной повесткой дня; Стратегическое управление массовым сознанием”]  One can just imagine what would happen in the United States if the President asked for budget authority to conduct information operations so as to accomplish “mind control” or “strategic management mass consciousness”. Pocheptsov sees films and other cultural exports of the United States as being a type of “sociological propaganda” [Социологическая пропаганда], and even fine arts are seen as a type of information warfare. The Cold War is seen as a “war of mass culture” with abstract expressionism pitted against socialist realism.  ” [“холодная война оказалась войной массовых культур, например, абстрактный экспрессионизм против социалистического реализма”]

This viewpoint is generally more comprehensive (larger in scope) that views in the United States.

Cyber War in Crimea and Ukraine

This blog is not intended to take a position on the situation in the Ukraine and Crimea. The Crimea has been controlled by different powers through history: Greece, then Rome, then the Byzantine Empire, the Empire of Trebizond, control by Venetian Republic. Catherine the Great in 1783 got the Crimea from the Ottoman Empire, which had occupied Constantinople. In 1921 it was a Soviet Socialist Republic, and became a state of Russia from 1945-54, then the Ukrainian SSR from 1954-1991. (Khruschev transferred the Crimea to the Ukraine.) After 1991 it was slightly separate from the Ukraine as  the “Autonomous Republic of Crimea with Sevastopol City. Now it has been annexed by The Russian Federation. Most of the people who live in the Crimea are ethnic Russians (61%) and speak Russian and many are inter-married with families living in Russia proper. Nevertheless, Russian actions in 2014 were viewed as being a violation of international law by Europe, and this triggered a series of sanctions. But here, we want to look at the information or cyber warfare aspects of the Russian annexation.

The annexation of the Crimea took place within the context of the revolution in the Ukraine. During those events, the Ukrainian leadership which was friendly to Russia was thrown out. Ukraine was divided ethnically. Away from the Crimea, the ethnic Russian share of the population drops off sharply. In the simplest terms, in the West, Ukrainians are in the majority, in the East, ethnic Russian are in the majority.

As events unfolded, there was a military component, but the information component of the takeover was stunning. The Russian operations should be studied as a textbook case of superiority. Public meeting, newspapers, radio, television, social media, and other informational networks was quickly harnessed by what can best be described as a coherent trans-media strategy. It went well beyond anything that happened in Libya or during the “Arab Spring” in Egypt.

Interviews with citizens Crimea showed evidence of a completely different sense of reality. The ethnic Russians there were 100% convinced that Ukrainian fascists from Kiev were marching towards the Crimea. These fascist invaders were “burning Russian homes and raping Russian women”.  There was a complete sense of panic, and the scarcity of information (except what was being supplied), made the uncertainty even greater.  Having watched the speeches that were being streamed on YouTube, this writer can attest to their emotional content and dramatic content.

When the time came, it was a foregone conclusion that the vote would be overwhelmingly in favor of union with the Russian Federation.

In terms of information warfare doctrine, the Ukraine is a perfect example of how a coherent and well-managed campaign can complement other actions, here the use of military force, much of which was covert.

If we compare US actions in the Middle East, there is no such coherency between military action and information operations. The Russian actions in Crimea appear to indicate the United States has lost the ability or does not have the skills to conduct an equally integrated cyber strategy. If there is a “cyber race”, the Americans are losing.

In the next part of this blog, we will examine other examples and cases of cyber and information warfare.

 

 

References (courtesy of Psyfactor.org)

Ярослав Деркаченко, Эволюция понятия «информационная война», 2016.

Георгий Почепцов, Информационная политика и безопасность современных государств, 2011.

 

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January 11, 2017

The Rise of Cyber Nationalism

Countries now have informal gangs of cyber warriors positioned to attack foreign countries. This appears to have happened a number of times. Reports indicate that after the president of Taiwan made a congratulatory telephone call to Mr. Trump, the 45th President elect of the United States, nationalists in mainland China launched a series of cyber attacks against facilities in Taiwan. Since there are so many Chinese in the mainland, and since Taiwan is so small in comparison, one can imagine the severity of the damage. Various news reports (The Diplomat, The Jamestown Foundation, Financial Times) indicate that the current Chinese government is “worried” about the ferocity of these cyber attacks.

Cyber Nationalism

In China, the fear is “cyber nationalism”, the spontaneous development of nationalist “armies” of hackers who attack foreign countries viewed as being antagonistic to China. Below we list various techniques identified as being associated with cyber nationalists.

Malicious Hacking. Attacks may take place against websites of a foreign government in an “enemy” country. Or attacks may take place against foreign newsmedia that publishes information not favorable to the hacker’s home country, its foreign policy, its domestic policy, its leadership, or its government. In general, “hacking” is a broad and less-than-specific term that may refer to a number of actions including (1) Denial of Service (DOS) attacks against a website, thus more or less making it impossible for people to find the website or use it; (2) Introduction of propaganda onto the target website; for example, instead of having its regular home page show up, a defaced home page will show up containing a negative message for readers; (3) Alteration of information on a website, either in a major or subtle way; (4) introducing malicious code onto the target website.

Social Media. A second tactic is to bombard social media with the intended political message. This can be of either the positive or negative variety. “Positive” refers to setting up social media locations, such as a Facebook page, that expresses a point of view compatible with that of the cyber nationalists. “Negative” refers to visiting social media pages of organizations or individuals who have an opposing (or targeted) point of view, and introducing (or bombarding the site with) harsh comments. There are a number of social media sites, but since Facebook is the world’s largest carrier of email, for all practical purposes, these social media wars take place on Facebook.

News Media. An increasing number of online news outlets invite comments on different news stories. Actually, this is a form of customer retention strategy. People will keep coming back to a website if they can “interact” with it. Sometimes these comments can be made anonymously; other times they require registration to identify the commentators. Online registration has a variety of levels of security and authenticity. In most cases, however, it is possible to register with only a reference email account, and email accounts themselves can be false. This makes it possible for trolls to be accredited anonymously, or to even register under more than one identity. These comments in the media can have a significant effect, one would suppose. (We need to take a look at more detailed social science and communications/media research to see if anyone has empirically measured the effects on public opinion and published the results in a scientific journal.)  But for the time being, let’s assume these armies of commentators can have an effect.

Other Examples of Cyber Nationalism

China is not the only country with entrenched cyber nationalists.  Russia is reported to have conducted “information warfare” in connection with its campaign in the Ukraine. (See “Cyber Threats and Russian Information Warfare” published by the Jewish Policy Center; or “Russia’s Information Warfare” published in Politico; or “Russian and the Menace of Unreality: How Vladimir Putin is revolutionizing information warfare” published in The Atlantic; or “Что такое информационная война?” [What is Information Warfare?] published in ВОПРОСИК; or “Информационная война: определения и базовые понятия” [Information warfare: definitions and basic concepts] published in PsyFactor; or “論中共「信息戰」之不對稱作戰” [The Asymmetric Operation/War of PRC’s Information Warfare] . )

And there is no reason to single out Russia or China only. Other countries do the same thing. For Israel, see “Information and Warfare: The Israeli Case” by Gideon Avidor and Russell W. Glenn. India established an “Information Warfare Agency” to counter messages from its dear friends in Pakistan. We can assume that every advanced country has developed an information warfare strategy, or at least is thinking about it. Some countries are better than others.

Issues for Cyber Arms Control

The essential problem of Cyber Nationalism is its informal nature. In cases like China, and reportedly Russia (which are the strongest examples), there is little if any connection between the government and the cyber nationalist movements. What we have is the spontaneous formation of nationalist cyber activists who are willing to cross over international borders and take cyber action in support of their country. In their heart, they are patriots, eager to defend the honor and reputation of their homeland as they see it.

It would be difficult and probably very controversial for any government to crack down on their private citizens because they were promoting their country overseas in cyberspace.

This means that in terms of an international treaty for control of cyber weapons, cyber nationalism would be problematical to include. It would mean that by acquiescing to an international agreement (treaty) nations would need to agree to crack down (arrest; prosecute; punish; fine) their own nationals when they engage in international cyber activism. Even if there were such an agreement, it would be very difficult to enforce from a practical point of view.

  1. How would the government be notified of the violation overseas?
  2. How would it be possible to verify the true identity of the person committing the violation?
  3. What would be the evidentiary requirements in the judicial process?
  4. What would happen if the action taken abroad by a cyber nationalist was considered a crime where it was committed, but not a crime in the country which is the domicile of the alleged offender? (For example, would a United States prosecutor punish an American citizen because they published information on a Chinese website that in China was considered to be illegal, but in the US would be acceptable or even a form of protected speech?)
  5. Given the number of persons involved, how would it be possible from a practical point of view to police the actions of hundreds of thousands of citizens?

The Criminal Element of Cyber Activism. In the above list, we mentioned two general classes of cyber activism expressing cyber nationalism. In most cases, working on social media and making comments on newsmedia websites that themselves invite commentary would not be illegal, regardless of how outrageous or biased the comments. On the other hand, cyber vandalism (denial of service attacks; hacking of websites to change or distort the information there) is definitely illegal, and probably illegal in all countries.

Application to International Treaty

cyber-crimes-treaty-001

Figure 1 Treaty coverage for cyber crimes connected with cyber nationalism.

We can conclude, therefore, that an international treaty might be able to tighten up the enforcement against criminal actions.  Presumably, Country A would be willing to prosecute its citizens who performed recognized cyber crimes in Country B, if Country B was willing to prosecute its citizens who performed recognized cyber crimes in Country A. See Figure 1.

This type of agreement would be difficult to negotiate because the definition of cybercrime changes from one country to another. It would be easier to start with bilateral treaty negotiations, but more effective if a global treaty could be put in place.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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